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Evolution of Cooperation on Spatially Embedded Networks
Pierre Buesser∗ and Marco Tomassini†
Information Systems Institute, HEC, University of Lausanne, Switzerland
In this work we study the behavior of classical two-person, two-strategies evolutionary games on
networks embedded in a Euclidean two-dimensional space with different kinds of degree distribu-
tions and topologies going from regular to random, and to scale-free ones. Using several imitative
microscopic dynamics, we study the evolution of global cooperation on the above network classes
and find that specific topologies having a hierarchical structure and an inhomogeneous degree dis-
tribution, such as Apollonian and grid-based networks, are very conducive to cooperation. Spatial
scale-free networks are still good for cooperation but to a lesser degree. Both classes of networks
enhance average cooperation in all games with respect to standard random geometric graphs and
regular grids by shifting the boundaries between cooperative and defective regions. These findings
might be useful in the design of interaction structures that maintain cooperation when the agents
are constrained to live in physical two-dimensional space.
PACS numbers: 89.75.Hc, 87.23.Ge, 02.50.Le, 87.23.Kg
I. INTRODUCTION
In a strategic context, Game Theory is an ”ìnteractive decision theory“ where an agent’s optimal action for herself
depends on expectations on the actions of other agents - including herself [1]. This approach has proved very useful in
a number of settings in biology, economy, and social science. Evolutionary game theory in particular is well suited to
the study of strategic interactions in animal and human populations that are large and well-mixed in the sense that
any agent can interact with any other agent in the population (see e.g. [2–4]). However, lattice-structured populations
were used starting with the works of Axelrod on the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma [5] and of Nowak and May on the
one-shot case [6]. Especially in the last few years, population structures with local interactions have been brought to
the focus of research as it is known that social interactions can be better represented by networks of contacts in which
∗Electronic address: pierre.buesser@unil.ch
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2nodes represent agents and links stand for their relationships. This literature is already rather abundant and it is
difficult to be exhaustive; good recent reviews can be found in [7–9] and important foundational work dealing with the
microscopic agent dynamics appears, among others, in [10–13]. Most of the recent work has dealt with populations
of agents structured as non-spatial graphs (relational graphs), i.e. networks in which there is no underlying spatial
structure and distances are measured in terms of edge hops. Relational networks are adequate in many cases; for
instance, when two people have a connection in Facebook, for the purposes of the electronic communication, their
actual physical distance is irrelevant, although many links in the network will be related to closeness in space. However,
often it is the case that actual distances matter; for example, networks such as the road or the railway networks are
of this type. Thus, while the recent focus in complex network research has been mainly on relational graphs, spatial
graphs are also very important and have attracted attention (see [14] for an excellent recent review).
In evolutionary games regular graphs such as one- and two-dimensional lattices have been used early on to provide
a local structure to the population of interacting agents [5, 6]. These networks can be considered relational for certain
purposes but can also be trivially embedded in some low-dimensional Euclidean space, with the associated distance
metric. Practically the totality of the work on spatial evolutionary games has been done on this kind of structure and
a large literature has been produced (for a summary with references to previous work see [15]). To the best of our
knowledge, only few works have dealt with spatial networks other than grids in games e.g. [16, 17]. In [16] geometric
random graphs, which are Euclidean graphs built by drawing links between nodes that are within a given distance,
and spatially embedded Watts–Strogatz networks are used in connection with the Naming Game. Ref. [17] deals with
games on Apollonian networks, which can be viewed as Euclidean networks that can be built by recursively joining a
new node in the interior of a triangle with the nodes at its vertices. This kind of graphs will be referred to later in
the present work. Clearly, grids are only an approximation to actual spatial graphs representing networks of contacts
in the physical world [14].
In the present work we extend the ideas and methods of evolutionary game theory to fixed spatial networks that go
beyond the much-studied discrete two-dimensional lattices. Previous results show that networks with heterogeneous
degree distributions increase cooperation in the Hawks-Dowes games, while regular lattices increase cooperation in
the Stag-Hunt games [8, 18, 19]. Therefore we study spatial network models with a scale-free degree distribution as a
first step. In a second part, by extending a previous work [17], we show that Apollonian networks [20] are such that
both the benefits of spatiality and scale-free degree distribution can be gathered. Some previous works use reduced
game spaces. As these settings are not suitable for our discussion, we extend them to a larger game space. Mobility
3(see e.g. [21, 22]) is an important issue in these spatial networks but, as an obvious first step, here we shall deal
only with static networks. Our exploratory approach is based on numerical Monte Carlo simulations since an exact
analytical description is essentially only possible in the mean-field case.
II. EVOLUTIONARY GAMES ON NETWORKS
A. The Games Studied
We investigate three classical two-person, two-strategy, symmetric games classes, namely the Prisoner’s Dilemma
(PD), the Hawk-Dove Game (HD), and the Stag Hunt (SH). These three games are simple metaphors for different kinds
of dilemmas that arise when individual and social interests collide. The Harmony game (H) is included for completeness
but it doesn’t originate any conflict. The main features of these games are summarized here for completeness; more
detailed accounts can be found elsewhere e.g. [2–4]. The games have the generic payoff matrix M (equation 1) which
refers to the payoffs of the row player. The payoff matrix for the column player is simply the transpose M⊤ since the
game is symmetric.


C D
C R S
D T P

 (1)
The set of strategies is Λ = {C,D}, where C stands for “cooperation” and D means “defection”. In the payoff matrix
R stands for the reward the two players receive if they both cooperate, P is the punishment if they both defect, and
T is the temptation, i.e. the payoff that a player receives if he defects while the other cooperates getting the sucker’s
payoff S. In order to study the usual standard parameter space [8, 19], we restrict the payoff values in the following
way: R = 1, P = 0, −1 ≤ S ≤ 1, and 0 ≤ T ≤ 2.
For the PD, the payoff values are ordered such that T > R > P > S. Defection is always the best rational
individual choice, so that (D,D) is the unique Nash Equilibrium (NE) and also the only fixed point of the replicator
dynamics [2, 3]. Mutual cooperation would be socially preferable but C is strongly dominated by D.
In the HD game, the order of P and S is reversed, yielding T > R > S > P . Thus, when both players defect they
each get the lowest payoff. Players have a strong incentive to play D, which is harmful for both parties if the outcome
produced happens to be (D,D). (C,D) and (D,C) are NE of the game in pure strategies. There is a third equilibrium
in mixed strategies which is the only dynamically stable equilibrium [2, 3].
4In the SH game, the ordering is R > T > P > S, which means that mutual cooperation (C,C) is the best outcome,
Pareto-superior, and a NE. Pareto-superior means that the equilibrium is a set of strategies, one for each player, such
that there is no other strategy profile in which all players receive payoffs at least as high, and at least one player
receives a strictly higher payoff. The second NE, where both players defect is less efficient but also less risky. The
tension is represented by the fact that the socially preferable coordinated equilibrium (C,C) might be missed for “fear”
that the other player will play D instead. The third mixed-strategy NE in the game is evolutionarily unstable [2, 3].
Finally, in the H game R > S > T > P or R > T > S > P . In this case C strongly dominates D and the trivial
unique NE is (C,C). The game is non-conflictual by definition and does not cause any dilemma, it is mentioned to
complete the quadrants of the parameter space.
In the TS-plane each game class corresponds to a different quadrant depending on the above ordering of the payoffs as
depicted in Fig 1, left image, and the figures that follow. We finally remark that a rigorous study of the evolutionary
dynamics of 2× 2 matrix games in finite mixing populations has been published by Antal and Scheuring [23].
B. Population Structure
The population of players is a connected undirected graphG(V,E), where the set of vertices V represents the agents,
while the set of edges E represents their symmetric interactions. The population size N is the cardinality of V . The
set of neighbors Vi of an agent i are the agents that are directly connected to i; the cardinality |Vi| is the degree ki of
vertex i ∈ V . The average degree of the network is called 〈k〉, and p(k) is the network’s degree distribution function.
C. Payoff Calculation and Strategy Update Rules
We need to specify how individual’s payoffs are computed and how agents decide to revise their current strategy,
taking into account that each agent only interacts locally with its first neighbors, not globally as in well mixed
populations. Let σi(t) be a vector giving the strategy profile at time t with C = (1, 0) and D = (0, 1) and let M be
the payoff matrix of the game (equation 1). The quantity
Πi(t) =
∑
j∈Vi
σi(t) M σ
⊤
j (t) (2)
is the cumulated payoff collected by player i at time step t.
We use an asynchronous scheme for strategy update, i.e. players are updated one by one by choosing a random
player in each step. Several strategy update rules are customary in evolutionary game theory. Here we shall describe
5the four imitative update protocols that have been used in our simulations. The first three are well known; we thank
an anonymous reviewer for suggesting a rule very similar to the fourth one presented here.
The local fitness-proportional rule is stochastic and gives rise to replicator dynamics (RD) [24, 25]. Player i’s strategy
σi is updated by randomly drawing another player j from the neighborhood Vi, and replacing σi by σj with probability:
p(σi → σj) =


(Πj −Πi)/K if Πj > Πi
0 if Πj ≤ Πi
(3)
where Πj −Πi is the difference of the payoffs earned by j and i respectively. K = max(ki, kj)[(max(1, T )−min(0, S)]
ensures proper normalization of the probability p(σi → σj). This normalization increase the frequency of imitations
between nodes with smaller degree. A more flexible update rule without the problem of normalization is the Fermi
rule. Here the randomly chosen player i is given the opportunity to imitate a randomly chosen neighbor j with
probability :
p(σi → σj) =
1
1 + exp(−β(Πj −Πi))
(4)
where β is a constant corresponding to the inverse temperature of the system, i.e. high temperature implies that
imitation is random to a large extent and depends little on the payoffs. Thus when β → 0 the probability of imitating j
tends to a constant value 0.5 and when β →∞ the rule becomes deterministic: i imitates j if (Πj−Πi) > 0, otherwise
it doesn’t. For β ⊂ [1.0, 10.0] the rule leads approximatively to similar results as the local fitness-proportional one.
Another imitative strategy update protocol is to switch to the strategy of the neighbor that has scored best in the
last time step. In contrast with the previous one, this rule is deterministic. This imitation of the best (IB) policy can
be described in the following way: the strategy si(t) of individual i at time step t will be
si(t) = sj(t− 1), (5)
where
j ∈ {Vi ∪ i} s.t. Πj = max{Πk(t− 1)}, ∀k ∈ {Vi ∪ i}. (6)
That is, individual i will adopt the strategy of the player with the highest payoff among its neighbors including itself.
If there is a tie, the winner individual is chosen uniformly at random. The next update rule is a randomized version
of the imitation of the best that we call IBR. Here player i imitates player j according to formula 3, but K is such
that
∑
j∈Vi
pij = 1.
6A final remark is in order here. The above model rules are common and almost standard in numerical simulation
work, which has the advantage that the mathematics is simpler and results can be compared with previous work such
as, for instance, [8, 19]. However, it is far from clear whether these rules are representative of the ways in which
human players actually take their strategic decisions, as has been shown by many laboratory experiments. In these
experiments it seems that learning and heuristics play an important role. Moreover, players are inhomogeneous in
their behavior while our stereotyped automata all behave in the same way and never change or adapt. Some less
conventional work along these lines can be found in [26, 27]. In Cardillo et al. [26] standard strategy update rules
are used but they are permitted to co-evolve with the agent’s strategies. In Szolnoki et al. [27], rather than imitating
strategies, agents imitate a proxy that stands for emotions among their neighbors.
D. Simulation Parameters
The TS-plane has been sampled with a grid step of 0.1 and each value in the phase space reported in the figures is
the average of 50 independent runs using a fresh graph realization for each run, except for strictly regular or degree-
invariant networks. The evolution proceeds by first initializing the players at the nodes of the network with one of
the two strategies uniformly at random such that each strategy has a fraction of approximately 1/2 unless otherwise
stated. For each grid point, agents in the population are chosen sequentially at random to revise their strategies
(asynchronous updating). Payoffs are updated after each strategy change. We let the system evolve for a period of
2 ∗N time steps. At this point the system has reached a steady state in which the frequency of cooperators is stable
except for small fluctuations. We then let the system evolve for 300 further steps and take the average cooperation
value in this interval. We repeat the whole process 50 times for each grid point and, finally, we report the average
cooperation values over those 50 repetitions.
III. RESULTS
In the following sections we investigate how spatiality affects cooperation through its effect on network topology.
In section IIIA we study a class of spatial scale-free networks, and in section III B we study Apollonian networks,
a different model of spatial scale-free network leading to high levels of cooperation. Spatial scale-free networks and
Apollonian networks combine spatiality and scale-free degree distribution. In section III C we propose a class of
hierarchical spatial networks derived from lattices and random geometric graphs which also improve cooperation.
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FIG. 1: (Color online) Left image: The games phase space (H= Harmony, HD = Hawk-Dove, PD = Prisoner’s Dilemma,
and SH = Stag Hunt). Right image: Average cooperation over 50 runs at steady state in a well mixed population (right
image). The initial fraction of cooperators is 0.5 randomly distributed among the graph nodes and the update rule is imitation
proportional to the payoff. Lighter tones stand for more cooperation. Figures in parentheses next to each quadrant indicate
average cooperation in the corresponding game space.
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FIG. 2: (Color online) Average cooperation over 50 runs at steady state in BA networks. Network size is N = 10000, 〈k〉 = 8.
The initial fraction of cooperators is 0.5 randomly distributed among the graph nodes. Lighter tones stand for more cooperation.
The update rule is imitation proportional to the payoff (left image), imitation of the best (middle image), randomized imitation
of the best (right image).
A. Spatial Scale-Free Networks
The right image of Fig. 1 shows cooperation in the well-mixed population case as a baseline to which we refer when
evaluating the amount of cooperation that evolves in network-structured populations. Scale-free networks, such as
the Barabási–Albert (BA) [28] and the configuration model (CF) [29], are known to induce high levels of cooperation
in HD games and also improve cooperation in the PD and the SH [8, 19]. Results on these topologies are shown for
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FIG. 3: (Color online) Average cooperation over 50 runs at steady state on the configuration model with exponent γ = 3.0,
with N = 10000, and 〈k〉 = 8.0. The initial fraction of cooperators is 0.5 randomly distributed among the graph nodes. The
update rule is imitation proportional to the payoff (left image), imitation of the best (middle image), randomized imitation of
the best (right image).
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FIG. 4: (Color online) Average cooperation over 50 runs at steady state in a regular lattice, the size is N = 10000, 〈k〉 = 8. The
initial fraction of cooperators is 0.5 randomly distributed among the graph nodes. Figures in parentheses next to each quadrant
indicate average cooperation in the corresponding game space. The update rule is imitation proportional to the payoff (left
image), imitation of the best (middle image), randomized imitation of the best (right image).
future reference in Figs. 2 and 3. On the other hand, spatial grids induce high levels of cooperation in SH games but
not in PD games, and they reduce the levels of cooperation in the HD games as compared to the well-mixed case [8],
see Fig. 4. In order to understand how cooperation is affected by the combination of spatiality and heterogeneous
degree distribution, we used a spatial network model with a given degree distribution. Our construction is inspired
by the one given by Rozenfeld et al. [30] and only differs from the latter in the way in which a given node looks for its
k neighbors. We start from a given sequence of target degrees {k1, k2, . . . , kN} and we place the N nodes in a regular
9lattice as in [30]. However, instead of selecting the nearest neighbors of a given node, the neighbors of a node are
chosen in the following way. For each of the k edges of a node we perform a random walk on the underlying lattice
starting from this node until we find a free neighbor whose effective degree is less than its target degree and we create
a link to that node. The process is halted when the effective degree of the considered node is equal to the target
degree. Since it is possible that a node has already cumulated edges up to its target degree, we fix a maximum m = N
for the number of random walk steps for the construction of one edge. We used a scale-free distribution p(k) ∝ k−γ
with exponent γ ∈ {2.0, 3.0, 4.0}. In order to keep a constant mean degree 〈k〉 = 8, the lower bound of the scale-free
degree sequence was shifted. Thus, as γ increases the distribution becomes more peaked around 〈k〉. The network
model just described, called SFSN, gives very similar results on cooperation as the one of Rozenfeld et al.; thus we
show only those concerning our model.
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FIG. 5: (Color online) Average cooperation over 50 runs at steady state on SFSN networks (see text). Size is N = 10000,
〈k〉 = 8 and γ = 2.0 (left image), 3.0 (middle image), and 4.0 (right image). The rightmost image corresponds to random
geometric graphs with 〈k〉 = 20. The initial fraction of cooperators is 0.5 randomly distributed among the graph nodes and the
update rule is imitation proportional to the payoff.
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FIG. 6: (Color online) Average cooperation over 50 runs at steady state on SFSN networks with imitation of the best update
rule. Size is N = 10000, 〈k〉 = 8 and γ = 2.0 (left image), 3.0 (middle image), 4.0 (right image). The rightmost image
corresponds to random geometric graphs with 〈k〉 = 20. The initial fraction of cooperators is 0.5 randomly distributed among
the graph nodes.
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For comparison purposes, and by analogy with Erdös-Rényi random graphs [31] in relational networks, we take as a
spatial baseline case the random geometric graph (RGG). Random geometric graphs are constructed as follows [14, 32].
N nodes are placed randomly on a subset of Rn; then two nodes are linked if their distance is less than a constant r.
The resulting graph has a binomial degree distribution which tends to a Poisson degree distribution as N → ∞ and
r → 0 [14, 32], with 〈k〉 = Nq(r) and q(r) = pir2/S, for n = 2, is the probability that a node is in a disk of radius r.
S is the total surface.
Average cooperation on SFSNs with RD and IB update rules for γ = 2.0, 3.0, 4.0 are shown in Figs. 5 and 6. The
first remark is that spatial scale-free networks are slightly less conducive to cooperation than the corresponding BA
and CF relational networks. This can be seen by comparing the first images of Fig. 2 and Fig. 3, which corresponds
to the BA and CF cases, with the second image of Fig. 5 which refers to SFNSs with γ = 3. Nevertheless, it can be
seen that SFNSs do favor cooperation especially in the HD and the PD space with respect to the RGG case depicted
in Fig. 5, rightmost image. It can also be observed that the gains in the transition between cooperation and defection
that is apparent in the SH games with increasing γ, are partially offset for low γ. The comparison with the RGG case
(rightmost image) shows that cooperation levels tend to those of the random graph case with increasing γ, except
for the HD quadrant where the RGG topology causes some cooperation loss. As in non-spatial networks [8], the
imitation of the best neighbor strategy update rule is more noisy and gives rise, in general, to somewhat higher levels
of cooperation. Results with IBR rule are similar to those with IB and are not presented.
B. Apollonian Networks: A Spatial Scale-Free Model with Higher Cooperation
An interesting case of scale-free spatial networks are the Apollonian networks (AN) [20] for which we show in this
section that they lead to high levels of cooperation. Apollonian networks are constructed by linking adjacent circles
in Apollonian packings. In the simplest case, an Apollonian packing is built by starting from three tangent circles,
adding a smaller circle tangent to the three previous ones, and iterating the process for each new hole between three
circles (see Fig. 7 and [20]). Our sample Apollonian networks have been obtained in this way after nine iterations and
are of size N = 9844 nodes. AN belong to a class of networks that are scale-free, small-world, planar and embedded
in Euclidean space. The degree-distribution exponent is γ = 2.585 and the clustering coefficient Ccl = 0.83 [20].
In a recent work, Yang et al. [17] have shown that Apollonian networks foster cooperation on the weak prisoner’s
dilemma (R = 1, P = 0, S = 0, T ∈ [0, 3]) using update proportional to payoff. The space covered is thus just the
segment at the frontier between HD and PD. Here, with the aim of extending the scope of the study, we sample
11
FIG. 7: (Color online)Apollonian network after two generations (see text).
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FIG. 8: (Color online) Average cooperation over 50 runs at steady state on the Apollonian network of size N = 9844, and
〈k〉 ≃ 6.0. The initial fraction of cooperators is 0.5 randomly distributed among the graph nodes. From left to right the strategy
update rules are: replicator dynamics, Fermi rule, imitation of the best, and probabilistic imitation of the best.
the full ST-plane. Our results are summarized in Fig. 8. They show that the AN topology is more conducive to
cooperation than SFNS and BA networks in the HD games, but also in the SH games, by shifting to the right the
transition from cooperation to defection at S = −1, as in other spatial networks. However, the amount of cooperation
gain depends on the strategy update rule. Replicator dynamics and the Fermi rule (first and second image from
the left respectively) have a similar behavior, and are also analytically close (if the exponent β of the Fermi rule is
between 1 and 10). On the other hand, the rule that prescribes straight imitation of the best (third image), and the
rule that imitates the best neighbor probabilistically (rightmost image) perform better. Intuitively, the first two rules
choose a very good neighbor to imitate less often than the latter two, especially when compared with deterministic
imitation of the best. This could favor the latter rules in an Apollonian network when some cooperators surrounded
by a majority of cooperators have gained a foothold on several hubs.
In [17], the authors discuss the topology features that induce the high cooperation levels. They point out, beside
other facts, the presence of connections between hubs and that there exist nodes with high gi and Ui, gi being the
degree gradient between a node i and its neighbors {Vi}, gi =
√
1
ki
∑
j∈Vi
(ki − kj)2 and Ui = ki ∗ gi. By transforming
12
the network they show that these features are linked to high levels of cooperation. They point out the high clustering
coefficient and explain that clustering increases cooperation on the reduced PD games as shown in [33].
C. High Levels of Cooperation on Lattice and Derived Structures
Simple hierarchical networks were shown to be favorable to cooperation by using a rigorous stochastic process of
the Moran type by Lieberman et al. [34]. In [35] we showed how to construct relational hierarchical networks that
induce high levels of cooperation. By analogy with the latter work, in this section we construct a lattice embedded
in two-dimensional space with a similar local structure and obtain high levels of cooperation. This model shows that
space along with some specific constraints creates such cooperative topologies. We first place the nodes on a regular
square lattice and label them according to their integer coordinates (i, j). Each node with coordinates such that
imod 4 = r and jmod 4 = 2r is a “hub” of radius r which is connected to all “small nodes” in a square neighborhood
of side 2 ∗ r + 1 and to the four closest hubs. This topology models a situation where there exist two kinds of nodes
distributed in space. One kind (vertices with few connections) tries to make undirected connections to the other kind
(hubs) while minimizing distances. Low-degree nodes have connections to hubs only. The hubs, in turn, form a lattice
in which they are connected to the closest hubs. In Fig. 9 we show such a graph with r = 2. Cooperation levels are
very good in all games and for all the strategy revision rules, as seen in Fig. 10. Indeed, the cooperation enhancement
goes beyond the best levels found in relational networks as can be seen by comparing Fig. 10 with Fig. 2, which refers
to BA networks.
FIG. 9: (Color online) Lattice topology with two kind of nodes. Each hub is fully connected to a square neighborhood of side
5 and to the 4 nearest hubs.
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FIG. 10: (Color online) Average cooperation levels on the lattice. The size of the graph is 10000 nodes. From left to right the
strategy update rules are: replicator dynamics, Fermi rule, imitation of the best, and probabilistic imitation of the best. In all
cases the initial fraction of cooperators is 0.5 randomly distributed among the graph nodes.
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FIG. 11: (Color online) Left : an instance of a random geometric graph with two kinds of nodes and r = 0.03. Right: Average
cooperation levels on an ensemble of these graphs as a function of the hubs radius; the frequency of hubs is 1/16, and the
radius of small vertices is null. The update rule is imitation proportional to payoff and the initial fraction of cooperators is 0.5
randomly distributed among the graph nodes. In both images isolated vertices were discarded.
Starting from random geometric graphs with arbitrary radius distribution, in the limiting case where there are two
different kinds of nodes, we show how a network with similar properties to those of the above lattice can emerge by
using the RGG model. We constructed random geometric graphs in the same way as explained in Sect. III A, except
that two nodes are linked if the sum of their radii is larger than their mutual distance. In Fig. 11 (left) we used the
following distribution of radius: 1/16 of the population has an arbitrary radius r and the other vertices have a null
radius. The undirected resulting network is composed of hubs mainly connected to low-degree vertices, which in turn
are not connected among themselves. The low-degree vertices which are not connected to any hubs are isolated. In
order to focus on the interesting part of the network, we discarded them, taking into account that they cannot change
their initially attributed strategies. Fig. 11 (right) shows that cooperation is greatly enhanced for a sizable range of
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radius r, although it doesn’t reach the exceptional levels of the lattice. The shape of the curves can be qualitatively
understood noting that, when r is small, say less than 0.015, the hubs have few connections between themselves and
the network becomes fragmented into small clusters. On the other hand, when r is large, the mechanism leading to
cooperation explained in detail in [35] doesn’t work anymore. Now low-degree vertices may be connected to several
hubs. This fact weakens the probability for defector hub to imitate the strategy of a high payoff cooperator hub, since
cooperator hubs are no longer surrounded by low-degree cooperators.
D. Network Type and Assortativity of Strategies
A potentially interesting question concerns the way in which strategies are distributed at steady-state among the
network nodes. At the beginning the distribution is uniform random but during the dynamics it typically evolves
and its final state could be different in different network types, according to the game played. This effect can be
evaluated by using several measures of “similarity” between vertices. Here we have chosen a measure that is inspired
by Newman’s work on assortativity in networks [31] [36]. A state will be called “assortative” if cooperators tend to
be surrounded by coperators and defectors by defectors. It will be called “disassortative” in the opposite case, and
there will be an absence of correlations between strategies if the distribution is random.
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FIG. 12: (Color online) Average strategy assortativity levels with the replicator dynamics on the Apollonian network (left
image), cooperative grid (middle image), and the regular geometric graph with 〈k〉 = 8 (right image). In all cases the initial
fraction of cooperators is 0.5 randomly distributed among the graph nodes.
In Figs. 12 we report the results of our assortativity analysis for Apollonian networks (left), the spatial cooperative
grid defined at the beginning of sect. III C (middle), and for RRGs (right). The first thing to notice is that strategy
disassortativity is only present in the RGG for the HD quadrant, as the HD stable equilibrium in well-mixed pop-
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ulations, and also partly in random graphs, consists of a mix of Cs and Ds. Now, due to the HD payoff structure,
locally a cooperator tends to be surrounded by defectors and the other way around for a defector. On the other
hand, in the middle and left images, in the HD space assortativity disappears because now the corresponding game
phase space becomes totally cooperative (compare with the leftmost images of Figs. 8 and 10). For the SH there is
an increase in cooperation too going from the RGG to Apollonian, and especially the lattice. The SH game features
two monomorphic stable equilibria in well-mixed populations which explains why assortativity is near zero in most of
the quadrant. Nevertheless, in the unstable middle and low region C and D can coexist thanks to the local network
structure that allows clusters to form. But here, contrary to the HD, the strategies show some positive assortativity
since it is best for players to coordinate on the same action. In Fig. 12 we observe that this assortative region bends
downwards and extends to the right in the left and middle image with respect to the RGG case (right image). This
region extends to the PD phase space in the two highly cooperative networks.
IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Evolutionary games on static spatial networks have been intensively studied in the past but mainly on two-
dimensional regular lattices, either taking into account Euclidean distances explicitly or implicitly, as they can be
trivially embedded in a metric space. However, lattices are only an approximation of actual network of contacts in geo-
graphical space. Indeed, many economic, transportation, and communication systems rely on actual positions in space
and agents usually have a variable number of neighbors. For this reason, here we have studied typical two-person,
two-strategies evolutionary games on spatial networks having homogeneous degree distributions such as geometric
random graphs, as well as heterogeneous ones with right-skewed degree distributions such as scale-free networks. We
have studied evolutionary games on two spatial scale-free networks models: a first one based on a variant of Rozenfeld
et al.’s construction [30] called SFSN, and the Apollonian networks [20]. Concerning the second model, we extended
previous results to a much larger parameter’s space, allowing to discuss our results more accurately. We find that
cooperation is promoted on spatial scale-free networks with respect to the random geometric graphs, except in the
Stag-Hunt games. Now if we compare SFSNs with BA relational networks, SFSNs show the same trend but the gains
are lower with all dynamics. Still, this is an interesting results since SFSNs are important in practice, for example
in ad hoc communication networks. On Apollonian networks cooperation is the highest ever observed on networks
of the scale-free type in all the games studied here, although Apollonian networks would be difficult to reproduce in
practice. We also point out that these results are robust with respect to the several standard strategy update rules
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used in our simulations.
Finally, we have introduced a two-dimensional hierarchical net whose structure has been inspired by a previous
relational graph model which highly promotes cooperation [35]. On this particular spatial network cooperation reaches
the highest values, with 66% of the population being cooperators in the average in the PD, the totality in the HD,
and 83% in the SH with the local fitness-proportional rule and the Fermi rule. IB and IBR give similar figures. Of
course, these unprecedented cooperation levels are theoretically interesting but can only be actually reached if the
special network can be formed and kept fixed, since naturally formed networks could hardly take this shape. However,
using similar ideas, we have shown that more realistic networks can be produced that can attain a rather high level
of cooperation using a modified construction starting from random geometric graphs.
The general conclusion of this work is that promotion of cooperation in all the games’ parameter space is possible
on static networks of agents constrained to act in geographical space, provided that agents interact according to some
special spatial network of contacts that creates a connection hierarchy among the agents.
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